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Abstract
Given that Nordhaus’ political business cycle theory is relevant at election
cycle frequency and that its validity can change over time, we consider
wavelet analysis especially suited to test the theory. For the postwar U.S.
economy, we exploit wavelet methods to demonstrate whether there ac-
tually exists an opportunistic political business cycle in monetary policy
by allowing for time-varying behavior and by introducing the frequency-
domain perspective. Our results indicate an inclination of the Federal
Reserve to cut the Funds rate prior to presidential elections except for
the 1990s. Moreover, such political manipulation is shown to signifi-
cantly affect output in not only the famous Burns–Nixon era but also
the Volcker–Reagan era. The outcomes are robust even when the effects
of government spending are controlled for.
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1 Introduction
To date, a large literature has addressed issues of central bank independence on
various aspects, also referred to as freedom of monetary policies from various political
factors (e.g., Frey and Schneider, 1981; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Acemoglu et al.,
2008; Jones and Snyder, 2014).1 In particular, most would concur on the importance
of elections as one of the most crucial factors affecting central bank independence.
In an influential article published in 1975, William Nordhaus presented the op-
portunistic political business cycle theory. In his framework, policymakers manipu-
late macroeconomic policies to get themselves re-elected, and consequently macroe-
conomic fluctuations follow the election cycle. The most famous case relates to
the historical political business cycle in the 1972 U.S. presidential elections of the
Burns–Nixon era. Backed up by personal tape recordings, Abrams and Butkiewicz
(2012) document that Arthur Burns and the Federal Reserve introduced an exces-
sively expansionary monetary policy following Richard Nixon’s insistent pressures
prior to the 1972 election. As a result of the monetary easing that followed, the
unemployment rate fell and inflation accelerated.
Since Nordhaus’ (1975) seminal work, numerous authors have attempted to sys-
tematically test the existence of opportunistic political business cycles (e.g., Allen
and McCrickard, 1991; Alesina and Roubini, 1992; Alesina et al., 1992). However,
Alesina et al. (1992, p. 227) state that “the empirical literature generated by the
Nordhaus paper yielded, at best, mixed results.” This situation remains the same
even today, although an extensive literature is devoted to the detailed examination
of political business cycles in the aftermath of Nordhaus’ work (e.g., Alesina et al.,
1997; Faust and Irons, 1999; Abrams and Iossifov, 2006; Grier, 2008). All told, as
Abrams and Butkiewicz (2012) mentioned, there seems to be no consensus on the
validity of Nordhaus’ hypothesis.
Unless there exists proof such as the personal tape recordings mentioned above
for other periods as well, we have to resort to some econometric methodologies to
determine such issues. To the author’s knowledge, earlier studies on the topic, almost
without exception, assumed regression models with election dummies included as an
independent variable. In any case, while our predecessors have tried various control
variables from different perspectives, we cannot find an appropriate model. The
failure to control for important factors can lead to bias in regressions. For example,
an omitted variable bias could be one reason for the mixed results in the empirical
1For theoretical analyses related to central bank independence, see, for example, Rogoff (1985),
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), McCallum (1997), and Weymark (2007). A more detailed survey
on central bank independence can be found in Walsh (2003).
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literature.
In order to resolve this unsettled question, we employ wavelet analysis to examine
the political business cycles in monetary policy for the postwar U.S. economy. In
comparison with the various regression analysis methods inherent in the empirical
literature, our method has mainly two advantages. First, it enables us to decompose
the election cycle components by frequency by using the difference in frequency
bands between election and business cycles.2 The primary advantage is that the
possibility of some estimation bias accompanying the regression approach can be
avoided. Second, because wavelets permit economic variables to change locally over
time at each periodic component, we can avoid the necessity of selecting the sample
period. Consequently, the present approach provides a comprehensive evaluation of
previous studies that target different periods and fail to reach a consensus.
Our wavelet procedure empirically supports Nordhaus’ political business cycle
model, in particular relating to presidential elections in the United States. To be
more precise, our contribution can be summarized as follows: (a) We show that the
monetary policy is expansionary prior to presidential elections except for the 1990s,
meaning that generally monetary policy is not independent of politics; this result
provides new insights into the empirical literature wherein heterogeneous outcomes
on the existence of opportunistic monetary cycles create confusion. (b) We also show
that such political manipulations significantly affect output in not only the famous
Burns–Nixon era but also the Volcker–Reagan era. In other words, we find that
the political business cycle in these two periods is actually induced by the Fed. For
the former period, the outcome is consistent with Abrams and Butkiewicz (2012)
and offers formal evidence. The results for (b) are robust even when the effects of
government spending are controlled for.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section explains our empirical
strategy for identifying opportunistic political business cycles in more detail after
reinterpreting the basic theory of Nordhaus (1975) from an empirical standpoint.
Section 3 presents our wavelet results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The opportunistic political business cycle
2.1 The basic theory and empirical strategy
Before detailing our empirical strategy, we outline the empirical implications of
Nordhaus’ (1975) model. Aside from various other models, his theory stands fun-
2Except for Funashima (2013), who uses a band-pass filter to identify the Fed’s behavior toward
presidential elections, no attempts have been made to examine such frequency-domain perspectives
introduced in the context of the U.S. political business cycle.
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damentally behind the present analysis.3 The underlying assumptions can be sum-
marized as follows.4
First, the model economy is described by the following Phillips curve:
ξ = f(u) + λξe, 0 < λ ≤ 1, (1)
where ξ stands for inflation, ξe the expected inflation, and u unemployment, and
f satisfies the usual conditions so that f ′ < 0. Second, the expected inflation is
adaptive:
ξ˙e = γ(ξ − ξe), γ > 0. (2)
Third, policymakers choose the level of inflation or unemployment and maximize
the vote function:
V =
∫ θ
0
g(u, ξ)eµtdt, (3)
where θ(> 0) is the length of the electoral period, µ the rate of decay of voters’
memories such that it takes positive values (µ > 0), and g the vote function in the
static case satisfying the usual conditions (i.e., Vu < 0 and Vξ < 0). In summary,
the incumbent’s optimization problem is to maximize (3) subject to (1) and (2).
To solve this problem explicitly, we specify the functional forms. For example,
Nordhaus assumes the following specification:
f(u) = α0 − α1u,
so that the Phillips curve is
ξ = α0 − α1u+ λξe.
Furthermore, he assumes that
g(u, ξ) = −u2 − βξ, ξ ≥ 0, β > 0,
and hence the dynamic optimization problem is shown to maximize
V =
∫ θ
0
(−u2 − βξ)eµtdt,
3Nordhaus’ initial model has been refined by some authors (see, e.g., Rogoff, 1990). For a brief
review of the development in the literature, see, for example, Alesina and Roubini (1992). More
recently, Milani (2010) studies several political cycle models in a New Keynesian framework.
4In what follows, the time variable is omitted when not needed for clarity.
4
subject to
ξ˙e = γ {α0 − α1u− (1− λ)ξe} .
Solving the optimization problem yields the following optimal policy:
u∗ =
(
βα1
2
+
B
A
)
exp {A(t− θ)} − B
A
, (4)
where A = γ(1− λ)− µ and B = −α1β(γ − µ)/2. From (4), we see that this model
generates political business cycles under certain parameter settings.
Note importantly that the resultant business cycle path depends on the pa-
rameter values, and that the shape is not necessarily saw-toothed as depicted by
Nordhaus (1975, Figure 8). It is highly probable that the path changes over time in
reality. In an extreme case, for example, if A = 0, then u∗ is independent of time.
In this case, no political business cycle occurs even if policymakers manipulate their
macroeconomic policies to maximize the above vote function. Moreover, even if the
parameters are stable over time, there is no reason a priori for every incumbent
policymaker to follow the same policy.5
In addition to these time-varying possibilities, we need to note that the timing of
elections is exogenously fixed and that political business cycles occur at particular
frequencies. In other words, the spectrum of output series resembles that in Figure
1. In the U.S. case, the interval of presidential elections θ is de jure determined to be
strictly 4 years. Overall, the election cycle is more frequent than the business cycles,
from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s business cycle dates. While the
duration of the business cycle is uneven, the election cycle takes strictly 4 years
to complete.6 Hence, it is useful to decompose the election cycle component by
frequency to identify the political business cycle.
Motivated by the two aspects, we use one of the wavelet (time-frequency) anal-
yses developed recently, namely, continuous wavelet analysis. As shown below, the
wavelet method enables us to examine how the economic variables interact at various
5Tempelman (2007) points out that the Fed is more independent of presidential elections in the
Volcker–Greenspan era than in the earlier period.
6One may view the Olympic Games as another crucial factor occurring every 4 years, because
they are held the same year of the U.S. presidential elections. In our sample period, since 1994,
the summer and winter Olympic Games are held alternately every 4 years, and only the summer
Olympic Games occur the same year of the elections. While no empirical attempt is made in the
United States in this regard, the effect on GDP depends on whether the games are held at home or
overseas. In the case of overseas Olympic Games, it is conceivable that they have negligible effects
on the United States. Even if the domestic Olympic Games increase government spending and
have a significant impact on GDP, the cycle of effects cannot be specified. In our empirical work,
as a precautionary measure, we use partial wavelet analysis to exclude these effects of government
spending.
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frequencies and how their relationship changes over time.
2.2 Wavelet method
Following Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012) and Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014), we
summarize our wavelet method.
To begin with, we consider the univariate case of a time series x(t). The contin-
uous wavelet transform for a mother wavelet ψ is given by
Wx(τ, s) =
∫ ∞
−∞
x(t)ψ˜∗
(
t− τ
s
)
dt, s, τ ∈ R, s 6= 0, (5)
where s is the scaling factor determining wavelet length and concerns frequency,
τ is the translation parameter representing the wavelet location in time, and the
asterisk denotes complex conjugation. Wavelet daughters ψ˜ are defined as scaling
and shifting the mother wavelet ψ:
ψ˜τ,s(t) =
1√
|s|
ψ
(
t− τ
s
)
. (6)
If the absolute value of s is less than 1, the wavelet is compressed. Conversely, if
the absolute value of s is more than 1, the wavelet is stretched.
All wavelet measures described below are based on this transform. A comparison
between the Fourier transform and wavelet transform may be useful to interpret (5).
A crucial difference between them is that the former depends only on frequencies
whereas Wx depends on time as well as frequencies. Hence, we can capture the
changing behavior of each periodic component by using the wavelet transform.
We now lay out the functional form of the wavelet. As in Aguiar-Conraria et
al. (2012), Rua (2012), Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014), Marczak and Go´mez
(2015) and many others, we assume the Morlet wavelet of the form
ψω0(t) = pi
−1/4
(
eiω0t − e−ω20/2
)
e−t
2/2,
where i is an imaginary unit (i.e., i =
√−1). If ω0 ≥ 5, the unit is approximately
equal to
pi−1/4eiω0te−t
2/2. (7)
By comparing this representation with the Fourier transform case, one can see their
difference again. The Fourier’s basic wave has a permanent length of the form
eiωt = cos (ωt) + i sin (ωt),
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where the corresponding waves in (5), ψ˜{(t−τ)/s}, are localized around τ , with the
length depending on s. In other words, while any time series consists of trigonometric
waves in the Fourier case, the wavelet in (7) is enveloped by a Gaussian function.7
From the above wavelet transform Wx(τ, s) = |Wx(τ, s)|(cos ρx + i sin ρx), we
obtain two pieces of valuable information. First, from the amplitude of the wavelet
transform Wx(τ, s), we obtain the wavelet power spectrum
WPSx(τ, s) = |Wx(τ, s)|2,
which differs from the classic power spectrum based on the Fourier transform and
indicates how the strength of the time series x(t) is distributed in the frequency
domain as well as time domain.
Second, we obtain the phase angle of the wavelet transform as
ρx(τ, s) = tan
−1
[
Im{Wx(τ, s)}
Re{Wx(τ, s)}
]
where Re(Wx) and Im(Wx) denote the real and imaginary parts of the wavelet
transform Wx, respectively. The phase angle is useful to examine whether the time
series x(t) rises or falls.
Turning now to the bivariate case, we assume x(t) and y(t) to denote two time
series of interest respectively. To evaluate the relationship between the two series,
for each wavelet transform we consider the cross wavelet transform
Wxy(τ, s) = Wx(τ, s)W
∗
y (τ, s).
Thus, we define the complex wavelet coherency as
Γxy(τ, s) =
S(Wxy(τ, s))√
S(|Wxx(τ, s)|)S(|Wyy(τ, s)|)
,
which represents the normalized covariance between x(t) and y(t), where S is a
smoothing operator in time and frequencies. Moreover, from the amplitude |Wxy(τ, s)|,
we obtain the wavelet coherency
Rxy(τ, s) =
|S(Wxy(τ, s))|√
S(|Wxx(τ, s)|)S(|Wyy(τ, s)|)
. (8)
7The Morlet wavelet is one of the most widely used mother wavelets. We assume that ω0 = 6, as
in Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012) and many other studies, because, when ω0 = 6 ' 2pi, we obtain a
tractable relationship between frequencies f and the scaling factor (i.e., f ' 1/s). Incidentally, in
this wavelet, the optimal joint time-frequency concentration can be attained in that the so-called
Heisenberg box area is the minimum value. See, for example, Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014)
for more details on the association with the so-called Heisenberg uncertain principle.
7
Note that wavelet coherency is akin to correlation coefficients, and we can interpret it
as a localized correlation coefficient over time, reflected by τ , and across frequencies,
reflected by s. Note also that since Rxy(τ, s) is calculated as absolute value, it cannot
be less than 0 or more than 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ Rxy(τ, s) ≤ 1).
From the phase angle of the cross wavelet transform, ρxy ∈ [−pi, pi], the phase
difference can be expressed as
ρxy(τ, s) = ρx(τ, s)− ρy(τ, s)
= tan−1
[
Im{Wxy(τ, s)}
Re{Wxy(τ, s)}
]
.
Following Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2012), we summarize the various possibilities of
ρxy as follows. When ρxy ∈ (−pi/2, pi/2), x and y move in phase. In particular, if
ρxy = 0, x and y move exactly together; if ρxy ∈ (0, pi/2), x leads y; and if ρxy ∈
(−pi/2, 0), y leads x. On the other hand, when ρxy ∈ (pi/2, pi] or ρxy ∈ [−pi,−pi/2),
x and y move out of phase. In particular, if ρxy = pi or ρxy = −pi, they move in
anti-phase; if ρxy ∈ (pi/2, pi), y leads x; and if ρxy ∈ (−pi,−pi/2), x leads y.
In the present analysis, fiscal policies might affect both output and monetary
policy at each periodic component. Hence, we need to eliminate such fiscal policy
effects. To this end, we use the partial wavelet coherency and partial phase difference
proposed by Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014).8 We now consider the case in which
there are three variables, x, y, and z. Our interest is in the relationship between x
and y, while z affects both x and y. In analogy with partial correlation, the complex
partial wavelet coherency of x and y after eliminating the effects of z on them is
defined as
Γxy·z(τ, s) =
Γxy − ΓxzΓ∗yz√
(1−R2xz)(1−R2yz)
.
From the absolute value of Γxy·z, we have the partial wavelet coherency
Rxy·z(τ, s) =
|Γxy − ΓxzΓ∗yz|√
(1−R2xz)(1−R2yz)
,
which can be interpreted as a localized partial correlation over time and across
frequencies. From the angle phase of Γxy·z, the partial phase difference can be
represented as
ρxy·z(τ, s) = tan−1
[
Im{Γxy·z(τ, s)}
Re{Γxy·z(τ, s)}
]
.
8The partial wavelet procedure is useful to eliminate the effects of the Olympic Games as well
as fiscal manipulation on elections. See footnote 6 for more details.
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3 Data and empirical results
3.1 Data
Our data comprise quarterly observations on output growth and monetary and fiscal
policy instruments. As proxy variables of the respective observations, following most
of our predecessors in the empirical literature, we use the growth of real GDP, the
Federal Funds rate (FFR), and growth of real government spending. All data are
obtained from the St. Louis Fed FRED website. Our sample period extends from
1954:3 to 2008:3. The ending date of the sample period is limited by the zero lower
bound on the FFR.
3.2 Empirical results
In this section, we report the wavelet results and accomplish two main objectives.
First, we examine the opportunistic monetary cycle, a necessary condition for the
political business cycle. Second, we identify the period of the political business
cycle. In doing so, we numerically compute the above-mentioned wavelet measures
by using the ASToolbox provided by Luis Aguiar-Conraria and Maria Joana Soares.
To investigate the existence of opportunistic monetary cycles, we first examine
the phase angle of the FFR, ρx, where x is the FFR. Figure 2 plots the presidential
election phase of the FFR, whose cycles are between 3.9 and 4.1 years. In the figure,
the shaded area represents the presidential election years. With the vertical axis
representing the phase angle, we find that monetary easing emerges prior to the
election years except for the 1990s.
In closely related work on the United States, Abrams and Iossifov (2006) and
Funashima (2013) suggest that the Fed is relatively expansionary before elections
from 1954 through 2004. On the other hand, Tempelman (2007) casts a doubt on
their suggestions over the long period and points out the possibility of such political
monetary cycles not being true in terms of the Volcker–Greenspan period from 1979
to 2004. In this connection, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) also indicate that the
Fed responds more systematically to inflationary deviations and GDP gaps in the
Volcker–Greenspan period than in the pre-Volcker period.
Our results provide a qualitative interpretation of the discrepancy in the litera-
ture. That is, at the minimum, the stability of parameters in the estimated periods
in those works is debatable, and Tempelman’s (2007) opinion appears justified for
a more limited period (i.e., the 1990s). Of course, the key insights obtained from
our wavelet procedure stem from the changing behavior of the FFR at election cy-
cle frequency. Abrams and Iossifov (2006), Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000), and
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many others estimate certain policy reaction functions through regression analysis,
wherein they are forced to assume that the coefficients are stable over a certain
sample period in order to obtain precise estimates. In an exceptional move, Fu-
nashima (2013) examines the Fed’s behavior using not a regression approach, but
a band-pass filter method, which fundamentally relies on the Fourier analysis, but
cannot capture the time-varying behavior at each periodic component, as already
discussed in the preceding section. On the other hand, in our empirical work, the
wavelet tools permit us to relax these assumptions and allow for the behavior of the
FFR to vary locally over time at election cycle.
In our next step, we examine whether those political monetary cycles affect out-
put. Figure 3 shows the phase difference ρxy and wavelet coherency Rxy, where x is
the GDP and y the FFR. The phase difference is calculated at frequencies between
years 3.9 and 4.1 per cycle as before. We expect the range of phase difference to
be between pi/2 and pi. This is because a negative relationship would arise between
them if the FFR affects GDP, with the FFR leading. When assessing the statis-
tical significance of wavelet coherency, we run Monte Carlo simulations such that
surrogate series are generated by the fitted ARMA (1, 1) model with errors from a
Gaussian distribution.
In Panel A of Figure 3, as expected, the phase difference is between pi/2 and pi
on the whole, revealing that monetary easing (tightening) results in a rise (fall) in
output with time lags at election frequency. Considering the above findings in Figure
2, we conclude that policymakers nurture an opportunistic political business cycle
through monetary policy manipulations, except for the 1990s under the Greenspan
regime.
Note, however, that the extent to which the political manipulation effects of
monetary policy impact output is open to debate. To evaluate the aftermath of the
political monetary cycle formally, we explore the wavelet coherency. From a simple
visual inspection of Panel B of Figure 3, we find two periods of high coherency at
election frequency (4 years), both of which are statistically significant at the 0.05
level. The first period is located approximately between the two election terms (from
1968 to 1976) and includes the 1972 election under the Burns–Nixon regime. The
implication of the result is consistent with Abrams and Butkiewicz (2012). More
surprisingly, the second period encompasses the 1984 election under the Volcker–
Reagan regime. Note that the evidence of the second period is new in the empirical
literature.
Up to this point, we did not consider the interdependence of fiscal policy. This
leaves open the possibility of imprecise outcomes due to the failure to control for fis-
cal manipulations at election cycle frequency. In an attempt to assess the robustness
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of the above outcomes, we explore the partial phase difference and partial wavelet
coherency excluding the effects of fiscal policy on output and monetary policy.
Figure 4 shows the results of ρxy·z and Rxy·z, where x is the GDP, y the FFR,
and z government spending. For the statistical significance of wavelet coherency, we
conduct Monte Carlo simulations as before. For the most part, these results reinforce
our above findings. In Panel A of Figure 4, except for the partial phase difference
exhibiting unstable behavior in the early 1990s, the same patterns are obtained as
before. Disregarding all frequencies outside the 4-year election cycle, in Panel B of
Figure 4, only the 1972 and 1984 election periods are once again encompassed in
the significant regions.
We complete our robustness analysis by reassessing the different band widths
including the 4-year election cycles. In order to do this, we reevaluate the wavelet
tools by slightly and variously replacing the benchmark frequency band interval
(from 3.9 to 4.1 years) with other values. As a result, regardless of univariate phase
angle or bivariate or partial phase difference, we obtain almost the same results. In
other words, all the qualitative features of our benchmark results on phase seem to
hold here as well, and they are largely robust.
While acknowledging the difficulty in identifying the occurrence factors, our
wavelet results nonetheless reveal a common pattern of the two elections: the in-
cumbent presidents (Nixon and Reagan) were re-elected under Republican adminis-
trations. This can be straightforwardly interpreted as confirming Nordhaus’ (1975)
predictions. However, although the 2004 elections presented a similar situation, we
do not find a significant political cycle in that period. In summary, while we con-
firm that we do not observe an opportunistic monetary cycle in the 1990s in the first
place, the central bank’s independence is relatively strengthened in the last three
decades.
4 Conclusion
Since Nordhaus’ political business cycle theory is relevant at election cycle frequency
and its validity can change over time, we consider wavelet analysis especially suited
to test the theory. In this study, we used wavelet techniques to examine the oppor-
tunistic political business cycle in monetary policy for the postwar U.S. economy.
In doing so, we shed new light on the empirical literature.
One of the most notable results of this study is that we identify the periods when
Nordhaus’ predictions are valid for nearly half a century. More specifically, after the
empirical characterization of the political monetary cycle, we provide the first evi-
dence confirming Nordhaus’ predictions in the 1984 election of the Volcker–Reagan
11
era as well as formal evidence confirming his predictions in the 1972 election of the
Burns–Nixon era. Arguably, such definitely specified periods cannot be uncovered
through some regression or classic time-series analysis.
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Figure 2: Presidential Election Phase of FFR
Notes: The shaded area represents the presidential election years.
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Figure 3: Coherency and Phase Difference between GDP and FFR
Notes: In Panel B, the black contours represent the 5% significance level. The white line
represents the cone of influence.
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Figure 4: Partial Coherency and Phase Difference between GDP and FFR after
Controlling for Government Spending
Notes: In Panel B, the black contours represent the 5% significance level. The white line
represents the cone of influence.
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